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I. Abstract 
Looking into the wireless world today, the most of data/information is transmitted in plaintext 
over the ether. These sensitive data/information possibly route through several intermediate 
nodes to a destination. To secure the sensitive data/information, the various ad-hoc 
technologies like Bluetooth, WLAN and ZigBee have implemented different security 
mechanisms and routing protocols. But since most wireless ad-hoc networks demand battery 
driven devices they will have limit resources to provide feasible security.  
 
The different technologies will be outlined regarding a set case scenario. We have a parking 
lot and want to secure cars against thievery. For this we conducted a research over suitable 
technologies and routing protocols. We concluded that using ZigBee would fill that role better 
than the other technologies examined. We also decided to use the build in routing 
mechanisms from ZigBee. We developed a solution outcast for the application level of our 
case and gave a foundation to build a test model on.  
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VII. Thesis Definition 
Formation of Secure Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Networks 
Consider a wireless ad-hoc sensor network that is built up like a tree structure where 
parent/child relation in the tree represents master/slave relation in the network hierarchy. At 
the top there will be a master (root) node that controls several slaves (children). Those nodes 
will be fixed. The slaves can in turn be masters to lesser nodes which will have none to few 
rights. They will join the network and register with their respective superior node, which will 
in turn inform their master node. For example a parking place for cars, where each car 
represents the lesser nodes. For a group of cars there is one controller node that answers to a 
super node that controls a section of the parking place. Those will then in return answer to an 
overall controller node that is responsible for the entire parking place.  
 
The first part of the master thesis will be to define what security is required in general from an 
ad-hoc sensor network. Starting out from that definition we will analyze vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses in the proposed architecture. Based on the security analysis we will look at 
different ad-hoc sensor network technologies and discuss their ability to fit into the specific 
case. Taking the security analysis and the different technologies in consideration we will 
propose a possible solution for an architecture that will give sufficient security in the overall 
ad-hoc network. The solution should consist of what technology to use and any limitations as 
to what the system can or cannot do. 
 
If there is time we will model and simulate the proposed solution and try to create a prototype 
model of the architecture.  
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1 Introduction 
In the wireless ad-hoc environments, the mobile devices may enter and leave the ad-hoc 
network rapidly. Consider a situation where two communicating parties are out of the wireless 
range of each other, but still participating in same ad-hoc network. The information (packets) 
between source and destination then needed to set routed through one or several intermediate 
nodes. Many ad-hoc routing protocols have been proposed [9, 10] but none of the proposal 
protocols provide security. 
1.1 Work Plan 
In this master thesis we aim to find a wireless ad-hoc solution for the specified case in the 
next chapter. This report will start with a description of the case followed by a security 
analysis to point out weaknesses and possible attack points in wireless ad-hoc networks. This 
analysis will then be applied on our case to highlight weaknesses.  
Following the security analysis we will take a look at different wireless ad-hoc technologies 
and try to find the most suitable technology to fit our case. After finishing the literature study 
we will create a proposed solution for the application level of our case scenario. 
This solution will include messages to handle all of the possible scenarios for our application. 
As an optional task, the proposed solution should be used to develop a model description 
which should build the fundament for a test model.  
Following the test model we set our goal to create a prototype using our proposed solution if 
there is sufficient time. 
1.2 Work Progress 
To start with our thesis was aimed at using Bluetooth to create a solution for our case. The 
working title was changed in February to include a technology study and determine if there 
are other technologies that may be better to use in our case. This means we used a month 
studying Bluetooth in detail which was not that needed anymore unless we concluded that 
Bluetooth would be our choice. We achieved to complete the technology and routing protocol 
study. We also completed a proposed solution and created a model description. Since 
everything after the proposed solution was optional and we were running out of time, the test 
model and prototype was dropped from the work list. 
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2 Case Definition 
We will study a wireless ad-hoc sensor network in this master thesis. The basic architecture of 
this system will be a tree structure with parent/child relations representing master/slave 
relations in the network hierarchy. This means there will be some nodes that are fixed in the 
network and are not supposed to move. In our case we take a look at a parking lot. We assume 
there are several parking rows. For each of the rows there will be intersections for nodes 
controlling groups of nodes (cars). Figure 2.1 shows our envisioned system in a tree structure. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Case Setting 
 
 
This system might be used for instance against car theft and for billing car owners for the time 
spend on the parking lot. 
 
Regarding the placement of the nodes around the parking lot we want to let the different 
sections overlap each other to receive redundancy if some nodes should malfunction. For 
instance if a group controller malfunctions we do not want the cars to loose contact with the 
super controller.  
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2.1 Limitations 
We limit our case to four levels in the hierarchy. In a real world implementation there may be 
more levels and connections between a car and a Row Controller or even a Super Controller.  
2.2 Proposed System Solution 
We take a look at our anti car theft system. A car (A) does arrive at our parking lot. The driver 
will have to find itself a parking space and park there. The driver then activates the system 
with e.g. using the car key to lock the car or simply when turning of the car. The transceiver 
node is then automatically activated. A will now register itself with its superior node the 
Group Controller (GC). The registered information could e.g. contain the vehicle registration 
number and eventually some more desired information. Now the GC will add a timestamp to 
that when A registered itself and pass this information on to its superior node, typical a Row 
Controller (RC). The RC will now add information about the GC to which A belongs and 
send this information on to the Super Controller (SC). The role of the SC can be defined as 
database consisting of all cars on the parking lot at the time being. Whether or not the SC 
stores the data locally or transfers it to a remote database which is in a secure location (away 
from the parking lot), it has to be secured against direct physical access and also have the 
highest level of security within the network. If the SC is compromised, the entire network will 
be in effect useless and should automatically trigger an alarm at the responsible authority. In 
larger cities it could be an advantage to keep the data from each parking lot located in one 
place instead of a database at each location. This would decrease the overall cost for each SC 
and rendering attackers unable to get direct physical access to the data stored. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Message Flow 
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RegInfo does contain the UID and a Timestamp (TS) which is encrypted with cryptographic 
measures to ensure its authenticity and freshness.  
The response message “OK” from the database is also encrypted. It will have to contain more 
information than only “OK”. A possible solution to this will be to add a cipher which is 
derived from the Secret Key used to encrypt the data and add this to the “Ok” and the 
Timestamp.  
 
After the registration process is complete the GC wills in periodic intervals poll the CNs 
attached it. This makes sure to early detect any theft of a car attached to the system. If a 
registered CN does not reply to a poll the GC will send a message to the SC. The SC will then 
send a message to either the owner of the car using SMS or send to a central authority e.g. the 
company owning the parking lot.  
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2.3 Register Process 
First we need to determine what kind of information will be transmitted in this part of our 
hierarchy. We need an identifier for each car and since the license plate does give us a unique 
number, we can use it as apart of our ID. However this number is very easily obtainable by 
any adversary and we will need to implement encryption for at least the authentication 
process. The registration process is the most vulnerable situation we will have in our system. 
If an attacker wants to gain access to the sensitive data sent over the network it is now. This 
means sending the unique identifier and timestamp will have to be encrypted. Using end-to-
end cryptography, we will have the GC on a need to know basis. This means the GC will be 
told by the SC what nodes to poll. In essence this means the GC will function as a relaying 
device used to send information up and down the hierarchy and it will work as a device to poll 
its attached nodes to make sure they are there until they are properly signed off.  
2.3.1 Car Node to Group Controller 
Now we get to the registration process for a car. First we assume that a car comes into the 
range of a GC and when the car is turned off it registers itself with the system. Now this 
happens in a way where it sends its unique chip ID, which has to be strongly encrypted, and 
its license number to the GC it is connected to. To ensure protection against replay attacks 
and freshness we add a Timestamp to the message. Now we do not want a simple GC to be 
able to decrypt the message so all it does is to add its GC number and relay it on to the closest 
RC. The key used for encryption will be a Shared Secret Key which is only known to the 
Database/SC and the CN. This will lead us to the following message: 
 
For CN to GC we will get: 
( )CN GCMSG Encrypted UniqueID Timestamp LicenseNr→ = + +  
 
And from GC to RC we will get: 
 GC RC CN GCMSG MSG GCNr→ →= +  
2.3.2 Group Controller to Row Controller 
Now since the chip ID number is treated confidential we don’t want any part of our local 
system to be able to decrypt this. So the RC attaches its own RC number and relays the entire 
package to the SC.  
 
 RC SC GC RCMSG MSG RCNr→ →= +  
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2.3.3 Row Controller to Super Controller 
After receiving the message from a Row Controller it will store the path description related to 
the License Number in a database. 
The SC now removes the location identifiers given by the RC + GC and sends the chip ID / 
License Number over an encrypted channel to a database containing a reference between 
License number and Shared Secret Key. The database looks up the License Number and 
retrieves the appropriate Shared Secret Key and uses it to decrypt the given information. If the 
Chip ID is verified successfully we can be sure that the car is what it claims to be. Now the 
SC will send an “OK” message down the same chain as the original message came from. For 
practical purposes we will only let the SC store the information containing the cars where 
they are parked. A RC on its part will only store its attached GC’s and a GC will store what 
cars are connected to it.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: Register Process 
 
Since every request from a car will be forwarded to the SC it will contain the full routing 
information to each car. In our envisioned scenario that will be around 4 nodes at least. This 
solution leaves us with a requirement of one powerful node and all other nodes don’t have to 
store way too much data. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows a typical registration process. This includes only the shortest path scenario, 
but it may as well include several Group Controllers and/or Row Controllers. 
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3 Security Aspects of Wireless Networks 
In this chapter we will look at typical weaknesses and attacks on wireless ad-hoc networks.  
Looking at physical security we can easily see that the fixed controller nodes need to be kept 
safe, which means at places not easily accessible by everyone. Since the nodes however need 
to be on the parking lot and have to be accessible for maintenance they will also be accessible 
for a possible attacker. So this is certainly a point to consider although not of relevance for 
this report so we will not discuss it any further. 
3.1 Threats 
Use of wireless links allows attackers to attack the ad-hoc network from every where within 
the wireless transmission range. These attacks are categorized as active and passive attacks. 
Active attacks could range from deleting, altering messages to injecting erroneous messages 
and impersonate a node. These active attacks can again be divided into the following 
subclasses [1]:  
• Masquerade – occurs when a node pretends to be a different node.  
• Replay – old information have been collected and replayed to perform unwanted 
access. 
• Modification of messages – the genuine messages or part of them could have been 
modified under transmission. 
• Denial of service – attackers could prevent legitimate users of a service from using 
that service. 
 
Passive attacks are eavesdropping on wireless transmission. The attacker tries to access 
information that is being transmitted over the air. These passive attacks can be divided into 
two subclasses [1]: 
• Release of message contents – the attacker could catch the messages or data which 
have been transferred wirelessly. 
• Traffic analysis – the attacker could analyses messages traffic to discover the 
location and identity of communicating nodes. 
 
The main categories of attacks on wireless networks are [1]: 
• Interruption of service – the resources of the system are destroyed or become 
unavailable. 
• Modification – attack on the integrity of the system. The attackers get access to the 
network, and modified the transferred messages. 
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• Fabrication – attack on the authenticity of the network. The attacker may insert 
record in a file. 
• Interception – attack on the confidentiality of the network such as wiretapping or 
eavesdropping to capture data in the network. 
• Jamming – the attacker flood the frequency band to interfere the legitimate traffic, 
such that such that the legitimate traffic could not reach the destination. 
• Client to client attacks – Wireless network users need to defend against each other 
(internal users). Not just from an outsider. 
• Attacks against encryption – weak encryption lead to an attacker can break the 
encryption. 
• Misconfiguration – misconfigured access points allow unauthorized user easily 
access the networks. 
• Brute force attacks against passwords of access points – the use of try/fails 
method, the attackers could discover single/simple password or key. The attackers try 
to guess the passwords or keys. 
• Insertion attacks – this type of attack is based on deploying a new wireless network 
without following security procedure. 
3.2 Security Services 
Security services are properties that could be used to enhance the security. 
• Authentication - this service is to ensure that the message is from an authentic-
source, ensure that each communicating party is the entity that it claims to be. There 
are three different variations of authentication: 
o Entity Authentication – the identity of a communicating party are known. 
The source or destination of the data is known. 
o Message Authentication – the property that a given message was sent by the 
claimed sender. 
o Data Origin Authentication – this property implies both the entity 
authentication and the message authentication. 
• Confidentiality – no one other than the sender and the intended recipient can read the 
message. The sender should encrypt the messages before transmit wirelessly. 
• Nonrepudiation – this service prevents the sending or receiving party from denying 
the sent or received message. This means that when a message is received, the sender 
can confirm that the message was received by the assumed receiver. 
• Access control – this service ensure that only the authorized users can use the system 
and deny unauthorized users from using the system. 
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• Integrity – this service ensure that the messages are sent properly without 
duplication, modification, reordering or replay. This mean the data received is 
guaranteed to be identical to the data that was sent. 
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4 Threat Analysis 
After looking at typical attacks against wireless ad-hoc networks, we will now take a closer 
look at which of those attacks are of special interest in our case.  
4.1 Physical Threats 
Since our system can’t be defined a true ad-hoc sensor network as it implements a stationary 
part, we get a slightly different threat scenario as a true ad-hoc network. Our super-nodes 
which build the core network will have to be protected against physical attacks. And even if 
an attacker gains direct access to them, they will have to be protected against being misused 
to bring down the network or falsify the information being sent to the controller node. This 
means we will need to use passwords to restrict access to the nodes. Here it is of importance 
that the passwords are made very difficult to guess and in a manner that brute force attacks 
will take very long time to accomplish. The physical protection will have to be implemented 
for each individual real life scenario and is hardly of any interest to this master thesis.  
4.2 Wireless Threats 
The securities we need to look at are protecting the node from tampering and protect the 
network from the common attack methods useable against wireless networks.  
First of all we will want to protect it against masquerade attacks, so we can be assured that the 
one we are communicating with is indeed the one it claims to be.  
Since it is quite impossible to eliminate the dilemma of hostile nodes eaves dropping our 
transmissions, we need to ensure that the critical data such as Unique ID’s and Shared Secret 
Keys are kept safe. Resulting out of eavesdropping and unwanted collecting of packets send 
over the ether we will need to implement protection against replay attacks. This comes to 
mind in case a car leaves a parking lot in a legit way, although an attacker has successfully 
intercepted that packet, we don’t want to enable the attacker to replay that packet next day 
and steal the car. Furthermore if an attacker attempts to perform a modification attack we will 
need to Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) check our packets that are sent over the ether. Other 
serious attacks on our network as Denial of Service and Jamming attacks have to be handled 
by the wireless technologies we are going to look at in chapter 5.  
 
Since eavesdropping is fairly easy in a wireless environment we need to ensure that our 
cryptographic methods will sustain attempts to break them.  
 
Morten Pedersen and Than Kim Thong                                                                               21
Formation of Secure Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Networks 
5 Wireless ad-hoc technologies 
Before we start looking at the different technologies available on the market, we will describe 
some functionality that they need to fulfill. First we want the system to have some sort of 
redundancy which would seem natural to implement into the case scenario. This will imply 
that each node needs to be able to hold routing tables and relay information to the next node 
on its way up the chain. This is to make the system more robust to device failure and to negate 
the effect if a node should be compromised. Secondly the technology has to support 
cryptography to enable secure communication and routing between the nodes. Of further 
interest are physical limitations of the different technologies. Since we don’t want the nodes 
in the cars to be easily visible and accessible, the technology has to have the ability to send 
and receive through a metal barrier. Also the transmission range has to be approximately 10 
meters to fulfill the requirements set by the case. Another point of interest is the use ability in 
different countries due to legal limitations. Furthermore we acknowledge that our system isn’t 
going to be a true ad-hoc network as it contains too many fixed parts which build our core 
network.  
We choose to take a closer look at the following technologies: RFID, Bluetooth, W-LAN and 
ZigBee. This is only a small selection of technologies in existence, however this are those we 
considered to make most sense to examine, as they are present different areas of use and have 
different abilities. There are a few technologies which might suit our case, which are not 
taken into consideration in this report as they simply are not completed yet and cannot be 
bought to make a product out of it. SmartDust was one of them and it looks promising, 
however the homepage of it isn’t updated anymore and it looks discontinued.  
5.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
5.1.1 RFID Overview 
“Radio frequency identification, or RFID, is a generic term for technologies that use radio 
waves to automatically identify individual items. [2]” Since this expression is very general 
and doesn’t say much more than that each technology used to identify an item is in fact RFID 
we will discuss the typical RFID system. A typical RFID system consists of a tag and a 
reader. The tag will in most cases store a unique number used as identifier and some 
information regarding the item it is identifying. The existence of very many different RFID 
standards makes giving a general overview over this technology very difficult. The two 
largest standards are a series of standards proposed by ISO and Electronic Product Code 
(EPC). 
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5.1.2 RFID Tags 
The tag itself consists of an antenna and a microchip. There are active tags that have a power 
supply on their own for computing instructions. However, the transceiver antenna still is 
without power. The other type is passive tags without any power supply. They will draw their 
power for computing and sending the response back from the power the reader emits. A 
passive tag will have a transmission range of less than 0.3 meters whereas an active (with 
power supply to the transceiver) tag can be read at up to 90 meters range. Which frequency is 
being used also affects read range. See table 5-1 for more information.  
5.1.3 RFID Readers 
To get any use out of RFID there is a need for a reader to read the information stored on the 
tags. The abilities of a reader depend on what it is designed to do. This includes how many 
tags it can read at one time and how much data it can read from those tags in a second. As an 
example from [21] there are readers that can read from 100 tags in one second and can 
manage up to 2000 tags in reading range.  
5.1.4 RFID Frequency bands 
For RFID there are specified four different frequency bands. Each of the different frequencies 
has their benefits and drawbacks. However which band is best suitable is decided by the 
application and the environmental challenges where it is going to be installed.  
 
Frequency Band Frequency Range Range 
Low Frequency ~125 KHz < 0.3m 
High Frequency 13.56 MHz ~0.9m 
Ultra High Frequency 850-900 MHz 3m-6m 
Microwave 2.45 GHz - 
Table 5-1 Source: www.rfidjournal.com 
 
Lower frequency means better ability to penetrate non-metallic materials and will have less 
power consumption. Higher frequencies will have higher rate of data transfer and greater 
range, but will consume more power and will bounce of materials.  
5.1.5 RFID Security 
Security in RFID is realized in a way that the transceiver can encrypt the data stored on a 
RFID tag. This will render an attacker limited to reading encrypted information from the tag 
although he will not be able to decrypt it without knowing the proper key. Since the 
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transmission range is very short, it should be fairly hard to eavesdrop anything unnoticed, 
however the technological aspects of RFID makes it even harder as in most cases the sender 
sends at a much higher power than the reply signal from the tag will be able to. This is due to 
the fact that the tag uses the emitted power from the sender to power its own reply signal 
making it just as much as a whisper compared to the originating signal.  
5.1.6 RFID Cost 
A typical RFID tag will cost from 50 cents and up to $50. Adding a sophisticated sensor can 
boost the price to over $100. The readers which are used to program and read the RFID tags 
will typically cost $1000. Expectations have it that chips will drop below 5 cents the next 
year.  
5.2 Bluetooth (802.15.1) 
5.2.1 Bluetooth Overview 
Bluetooth technology was initially conceived by Ericsson in 1994. As the idea grew, the 
special interest group (SIG) was formed to create Bluetooth standard. In the beginning the 
SIG consisted of five companies: Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia and Toshiba. Later, four other 
companies: Microsoft, 3Com, Lucent and Motorola joined the SIG to form the Bluetooth 
Promoter Group. 
 
“Bluetooth is an open standard specification for a radio frequency (RF)-based, short-range 
connectivity technology that promises to change the face of computing and wireless 
communication. It is designed to be an inexpensive, wireless networking system for all classes 
of portable devices, such as laptops, PDAs (personal digital assistants), and mobile phones. It 
also will enable wireless connections for desktop computers, making connections between 
monitors, printers, keyboards and the CPU cable-free. [4]” 
5.2.2 Bluetooth technology 
Bluetooth uses 2.4 GHz frequency radio band and transmits using a fast Frequency-Hopping 
Spread Spectrum (FHSS). Bluetooth provides ad hoc networking, and implements peer-to-
peer communication without the need of base stations or administration. Every Bluetooth 
device has a unique 48-bit Bluetooth Device Address (BD-ADDR). This address is used when 
establish a connection or generate an access code. To establish a connection, two or more 
Bluetooth devices have to be within the range up to 10 meter.  
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Elements in a Bluetooth system: 
• An RF portion, radio that transmits and receives data using 2.4 GHz frequency band. 
• A Baseband module to enable wireless communication between two devices. Before a 
master unit transmits data to a slave unit, the Baseband convert the digital data into 
radio signal and sends to the slave unit. At the slave unit, the Baseband have to 
convert these radio signals data into digital data such that the host application can 
process. 
• Link Manager, manages data transmissions 
• An interface to the host device (such as a PDA) 
 
Bluetooth modules can be used independent of the host, embedded or integrated the Bluetooth 
baseband module with the host.  
 
In the independent option the RF portion can be implemented as a module or as a single chip 
and be used independently or with the Baseband module. In this option the lower-layer are 
supported in the Baseband modules, while upper-layer are supported by the host processor.  
 
In the embedded option the RF and Baseband are embedded in a single chip. In this option the 
lower-layer and upper-layer reside in the same chip and will freeing the host processor from 
the protocol processing. The advances of the embedded option are that the design is less 
complex, use less power and lower cost in production. 
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5.2.3 Bluetooth Topology 
Bluetooth provides both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint connections. When two or 
more Bluetooth devices are within the wireless transmission range they form a small group 
and is called a piconet (see Figure 5.1). Piconet consists of one master and up to seven active 
slaves. The device that initiates a connection becomes the master and the others are slaves and 
response to the master. In an environment where the several piconets overlap each other and a 
device in one piconet can communicate with another device in second piconet. These overlap-
piconets are called scatternet (see Figure 5.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Piconet and Scatternet (source: [3]) 
 
Since Bluetooth provides ad hoc networking, and the movements of the devices, devices may 
enter or leave the piconet/scatternet rapidly. To save power, devices may enter one of the 
states or modes described bellow. 
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Bluetooth Major States:  
• Standby: In this state, only the unit’s native clock is running and requires low power. 
Hence only seven (at most) units can be active at a time, the units may enter the 
standby-state to free up the capacity on the piconet. 
• Connection: In this connection states, active connections are established by two or 
more units and data are exchanging. In the connection state, the unit may be in one of 
the following modes: 
9 Active: In this mode, the unit is active and participating the piconet. The 
active units are assigned an Active Member Address (AM-ADDR). 
9 Hold: In this mode, the units only support SCO packets (voice) and not ACL-
packets (data). This mode reduces the power consumption and the unit may 
enter paging, inquiry scan states. 
9 Sniff: This reduced-power mode support both SCO and ACL packets. 
9 Park: In this mode the unit releases its AM-ADDR and assigned a Parked 
Member Address (PM-ADDR). The unit are not participating the piconet, but 
stay synchronized with its channel, listen to broadcast. 
 
Bluetooth Paging States: In this state the master repeatedly transmits the DAC (Device 
Access Code) of the slaves, while the slaves scan for their DAC. This is to locate and 
establish a connection between master and slave. 
 
Bluetooth Inquiry States: Similar to Paging state, but in this state the master are looking for 
potential slaves which the master does not know the DAC. DAC are needed to establish a 
connection between master and slave. 
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5.2.4 Bluetooth Security 
To secure the data sends between devices, the payloads of packets are encrypted using stream 
cipher E0 [19]. The E0 stream cipher consists of the payload key generator; the key stream 
generator and the encryption/decryption part (see Figure 5.2). When encryption is required, 
the master and slave must agree which encryption modes to use. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Bluetooth Security (source: [3]) 
 
Security Modes: 
• Security Mode 1- the insecure mode, nothing is encrypted in this mode. Every 
device within the range can communicate. 
• Security Mode 2- In this mode the addressed traffic is encrypted, while the 
broadcast messages are not. 
• Security Mode 3- In this mode both authentication and encryption are enabled. 
All traffic is encrypted with the master key. 
Bluetooth devices are authenticated using challenge-response algorithm. BD_ADDR, private 
authentication key, private encryption key and RAND are used in the challenge-response 
process. A successful authentication is based on the fact that both participants share the same 
key. First, the verifier sends the claimant a random number to be authenticated. Then, both 
participants use the authentication function E1 with the random number, the claimants 
BD_ADDR and the current link key to get a response. The claimant sends the response to the 
verifier, who then makes sure the responses match.  
Morten Pedersen and Than Kim Thong                                                                               28
Formation of Secure Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Networks 
 
Figure 5.3: Bluetooth Authentication (source: [3]) 
 
The Bluetooth authentication process is depicted in figure 5.3. 
5.2.5 Bluetooth Cost 
According to Milorad Mitrovic [20] the price for Bluetooth chips will reach $5 each in 2005. 
5.3 W-LAN (802.11x) 
The first wireless Ethernet standard, plain 802.11, was adopted and published by the IEEE in 
1997. This standard provided several modes of operation and data rates up to only two 
megabits per second (Mbps). Later, the higher performance standards, 802.11b, 802.11a and 
802.11g are adopted. The "b and g" version operated in the same frequency range as the 
original 802.11, the 2.4 GHz Industrial-Scientific-Medical (ISM) band, but the "a" version 
operated on the 5 GHz Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) band. 
 
Wireless Local-area Network (WLAN) is a wireless communication technology using radio 
waves to transmit and receive data over the air. Based on WLAN non-cables characteristic 
and the fall in cost of WLAN products over the last years, WLAN’s are used widely within a 
building or campus.  
Morten Pedersen and Than Kim Thong                                                                               29
Formation of Secure Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Networks 
5.3.1 WLAN Standards 
WLAN standards includes 802.11, 802.11a, 802.11b and 802.11g 
 
Standard Data Rate Radio band Modulation Scheme Security 
802.11 Up to 2Mbps 2.4 GHz FHSS[22] or 
DSSS[22] 
WEP[24] & 
WPA[25]  
802.11a Up to 54Mbps 5 GHz OFDM [23] WEP[23] & 
WPA[24] 
802.11b Up to 11Mbps 2.4 GHz DSSS with CCK WEP[23] & 
WPA[24] 
802.11g Up to 54Mbps 2.4 GHz OFDM above 
20Mbps, DSSS with 
CCK below 20Mbps 
WEP[23] & 
WPA[24] 
Table 5-2: WLAN Standards 
 
5.3.2 WLAN Configuration 
In a WLAN configuration consists of a transceiver Wireless Access Point (WAP) connects to 
fixed network using standard Ethernet (IEEE 802.3). End user access the WAP using WLAN 
adapter such as PCIMCIA cards (see Figure 5.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: WLAN Configuration (source: www.wlana.org) 
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• Peer-to-peer - The simplest configuration of WLAN is a peer-to-peer. When two 
wireless adapters are within the wireless transmission range of each other, they can 
communicate directly. 
• Peer-to-Multipoint - When two or more wireless adapters are within the wireless 
transmission range of each other, they can communicate through a centralized 
administrator. This means that the adapters can not communicate with each other 
directly, but through a hub. 
• WAP as repeater - Access points can be used as a repeater to extend the wireless 
transmission range. Several repeaters (BSS) will then form an Extended Service Area 
(ESS). 
• Linking WLAN - WLAN can be linked to other WLAN’s, WAN or the internet.  
5.3.3 WLAN Range and throughput 
A single wireless access point can support several simultaneous users at a range of 90-100  
meters in free space and much less via obstructions and typical data rates in WLAN range 
from 1 to 54 Mbps dependent on which standard is used (see Table 5-2). 
5.3.4 WLAN Security 
WLAN (802.11 standards) uses the encryption called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) and 
using SSID and MAC-address table to secure the access to the APs. WEP uses the MAC-
address to limit the access to the network. But the MAC-address can be sniffed and stolen. 
This is one of the security weaknesses in WLAN. To improve the security WLAN also uses 
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) upon WEP. The encryption schemes are improved with the 
use of temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) and hashing algorithm. To solve the stolen 
MAC-address problem, WPA uses user authentication through extensible authentication 
protocol (EAP) to ensure that only authorized users can access the network. EAP is built on a 
more secure public-key encryption system. 
5.3.5 WLAN Cost 
Wireless Access Point (WAP) range in cost from ~$100 to ~$1150 and wireless adapters (PC-
cards) from ~$40 to ~$120 (prices from www.psdata.no 12.03.2004). 
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5.4 ZigBee (802.15.4) 
The goals of the ZigBee product solution is to deliver a low cost and low power technology 
that will take its place in the short range and low throughput sector. It is aimed at transmitting 
text and nothing else. It builds upon the open standard 802.15.4 as its radio source. The 
ZigBee alliance developing ZigBee consists of more than 70 companies (as of May11, 2004). 
The goal of the association is to develop wireless network tools based on a global open 
standard. The main companies leading the ZigBee alliance are Honeywell, Invensys, 
Mitsubishi Electric, Motorola, Philips and Samsung.   
5.4.1 IEEE 802.15.4 
The standard describes a simple packet data protocol for lightweight wireless networks. Being 
an IEEE standard it is standardized by the LAN/MAN standards committee from the IEEE 
consortium. It uses three different frequency bands. Those bands have different areas of 
operation.  
 
Frequency Channels Transmission Rate Area of use 
2.4 GHz 16 Channels 250kbps Worldwide 
868.3 MHz 1 Channel 20 kbps Europe 
902-928 MHz 10 Channels 40 kbps America 
Table 5-3: Frequency Bands 
 
To access the channels 802.15.4 uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision 
Avoidance (CDMA/CA). It further features multilevel security. A further design goal of the 
standard is to minimize battery consumption hence delivering very long lifetime of batteries. 
The estimated transmission range is said to be ~30 meters. The protocol implements 
functionality up to the Link Layers Control. Maximum number of nodes attached to a network 
can be up to  (18446744073709551616).  642
5.4.2 ZigBee Device Types 
IEEE 802.15.4 implements three different types of nodes. First there is the Network 
Coordinator type which is the most powerful of the nodes. It possesses enough memory and 
computing power to keep track of the entire network knowledge. The Full Function Device 
(FFD) is capable of working as a router and as a connectivity device towards the real internet 
for instance. The last of the device types is the Reduced Function Device (RDF). It only has 
limited functionality and works perfectly as a slave node in the network topology.  
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5.4.3 ZigBee Topology 
The devices in ZigBee may operate in either star topology or peer-to-peer topology. In the star 
topology, the FFDs may become a central controller (PAN coordinator) and form its own 
network. The central controller acts as a hub and allows either FFDs or RDFs to connect it. 
The communication between two devices may route through the central controller (see Figure 
5.5). 
 
In the peer-to-peer topology the devices may communicate directly with each other within the 
transmission range independent of the central controller. A peer-to-peer network can be ad 
hoc, self-organizing and self-healing. It may also allow multiple hops to route messages from 
any device to any other device on the network 
 
 
Figure 5.5: ZigBee Topology (source: [32]) 
5.4.4 ZigBee Routing 
ZigBee uses a simplified AODV (described in section 6.2) to route the packets. Routing nodes 
in ZigBee are characterized as RN+ and RN-. Both the routing nodes (RN) know how to relay 
the packets. The different between RN+ and RN- is that the RN+ possesses a full routing table 
and forwards data if there is routing entry, otherwise initiates route discovery. While the RN- 
forwards the packets by using cluster tree routing. 
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5.4.5 ZigBee Latency 
Since there are different modes of operation in a ZigBee environment there are different 
latency times. When a new node enters the area of a ZigBee controller it will take 
approximately 30ms to get enumerated. A sleeping node will have a wakeup time of about 
15ms. The average transmission delay will be about 15ms.  
5.4.6 ZigBee Security 
ZigBee provides confidentiality, integrity and authenticity by using MAC layer security. The 
MAC layer security uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [7] as the core 
cryptographic algorithm and is based on three operation modes: 
 
1. Counter Mode (CTR) – Encryption using AES 
2. Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) – Integrity using AES 
3. CCM Mode – Combination of CTR and CBC 
 
MAC layer security is used to secure MAC command, Beacon, acknowledgement frames and 
messages that transmitted over a single hop. However for multi-hop messages, the security is 
provides by upper layer (Network Layer). To apply integrity to a frame, the MAC header and 
payload are used to create a Message Integrity Code and the MIC is added to the frame (MIC, 
see Figure 5.6). However to apply confidentiality to a frame, the Frame Count and Sequence 
Count are used to create a nonce. This nonce again is used to encrypt the payload and ensures 
the freshness to protect against replay. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 ZigBee Mac Frame 
 
The Network layer also uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the core 
cryptographic algorithm. The multi-hop messages are protect by the Network layer. When the 
Network layer transmits or receives a frame, it uses the Security Services Provider (SSP) to 
process the frame. SSP applies security to outgoing frames and removes security from 
incoming frames. 
5.4.7 Advanced Encryption Standard 
Until recently, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [26] and 3DES was the most widely used 
algorithm for symmetrical encryption. But today’s preferred choice is Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES). Rinjdael algorithm has been chosen to be the new Advanced Encryption 
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Standard (AES). Rinjdael algorithm [7] is a symmetric block cipher [28] using 128-bit block 
size. With the cipher key length of 128 (default), 192 or 256-bit key, the AES is designed to 
be more secure than DES.  
 
Figure 5.7: Cipher Process overview 
 
The cipher process consists of the following transformation functions: 
1. AddRoundKey (), read AES [7] for details. 
2. SubBytes (), read AES [7] for details. 
3. ShiftRows (), read AES [7] for details. 
4. MixColumns (), read AES [7] for details. 
In the pseudo code bellow shows the process where these transformations are applied to 
produce cipher text. 
Cipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)]) 
begin 
byte state[4,Nb] 
state = in 
AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1])  
for round = 1 step 1 to Nr–1 
SubBytes(state)  
ShiftRows(state)  
MixColumns(state)  
AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1]) 
end for 
SubBytes(state) 
ShiftRows(state) 
AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1]) 
out = state 
end 
Table 5-4: Cipher Pseudo Code (source [7]) 
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The inverse cipher process consists of the following transformation functions: 
 
1. AddRoundKey (), read AES [7] for details. 
2. InverseShiftRows (), read AES [7] for details. 
3. InverseSubBytes (), read AES [7] for details. 
4. InverseMixColumns (), read AES [7] for details. 
 
In the pseudo code bellow shows the process where these transformations are applied to 
produce plain text. 
InvCipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)]) 
begin 
byte state[4,Nb] 
state = in 
AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1])  
for round = Nr-1 step -1 down to 1 
InvShiftRows(state)  
InvSubBytes(state) 
AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1]) 
InvMixColumns(state)  
end for 
InvShiftRows(state) 
InvSubBytes(state) 
AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1]) 
out = state 
end 
Table 5-5: Inverse Cipher Pseudo Code (source [7]) 
 
5.4.8 ZigBee Cost 
According to [8] the price of a ZigBee chipset is going to be approximately $2.50 if bought by 
Original Equipment Manufactures (OEM’s). 
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5.5 Summary 
After looking at four different technologies which we considered being able to solve our case, 
we now need to make a choice as of which of them to use and implement in our solution. The 
first technology we looked at was RFID. As shown this is a technology where its 
shortcomings outweighs its pro’s for our case. First of all its transmission range for passive 
chips is way to short with 0.9 meter. Furthermore plays in that if there is the slightest obstacle 
between sender and receiver range decreases or does make it impossible to send at all. Even 
the active chips with an increased range (9 meters) will not suffice as they also loose a lot of 
transmission range due to obstacles. But our main concern is the inability of the RFID chips 
to compute instructions. They will not be able to route information to another active node. 
Why did we take RFID into consideration at all? Our main reason was to couple a RFID tag 
on each car and put a reader as GC onto the parking lot. And then use an alternative 
technology as WLAN to relay the signals to a SC. However seeing the costs of either 
technology it would become a quite costly implementation and would leave us with a series of 
technical difficulties. Another problem with using WLAN will be the high power 
consumption. It will require each WLAN node to be supplied with a power cord. This would 
strive against the very idea to keep the whole solution wireless as we might as well use a 
wired technology instead.  
 
This means we need to find another solution. Since the original thought was to use Bluetooth 
for our case it was very natural to take a closer look at it. In a first glance it looks like a 
technology perfectly suited to meet our demands. Its computational powers are sufficient, if 
not even vast, for the limited amount of data we are going to transmit in our scenario. 
Bluetooth’s built in security features however have been openly criticized for being weak and 
that if you need a secure solution you will have to implement it yourself at application layer 
or remake the used routing protocol. This would lead to a lot of extra work but is certainly 
doable. The transmission range is 10 meter and 100 meter. The 10 meter solution is a tad 
short for our scenario and when using the high range solution it consumes too much power. 
Another shortcoming of Bluetooth is its high latency when it comes to registering new 
devices to the network. This may take up to 1 second or in worst case even more. Now given 
a driver is very fast in leaving his parking space he might be out of range before the necessary 
sign off data actually is sent. That is a problem which is very hard to overcome with any 
application changes. Bluetooth networks can consist of maximum 255 nodes in one network. 
So on larger parking lots there would be several networks that would need to be 
interconnected to resolve this problem.  
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Our conclusion is, after looking at the different technologies we deemed suitable for our case, 
that ZigBee offers the best solution. It is designed to be used in a sensor network that has 
static components to it. Therefore it has very limited power consumption and thus long 
lifetime on its devices. Furthermore its transmission range is ideal for a parking lot with 30 
meters range and if needed the range can be increased to 100 meters for the RC and SC’s. Its 
latency is short enough to ensure that processes will be complete before a node leaves the 
sending range. With  maximum nodes per network any parking lot should be covered, if 
not all of them over the world. The total cost of an implementation will be fairly cheap too 
with around 2$ per node. As a common note on all of the technologies described they are all 
useable in any part of the world. They all offer a global frequency band. Table 5-6 gives a 
short overview over the key differences in the technologies. 
642
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 RFID Bluetooth W-LAN ZigBee 
Battery Lifetime Infinite** 7 days N/A* 1 Month to 
years 
Security  N/A** 3 Security 
Modes 
WEP/WPA AES 
Range  ~0.3-9m ~10m ~100m ~30-100m 
Latency N/A** ~50ms  ~30-45ms 
Throughput N/A** 2Mbit 1-54Mbit 20-250Kbps 
Network Size ~2000** 8 active/248 
passive nodes 
10 per access 
point 
642  
Frequency Bands ~125Khz 
13.56Mhz 
850-900Mhz 
2.45Ghz 
2.4Ghz 2.4Ghz 
5Ghz 
868.3Mhz 
902-928Mhz 
2.4Ghz 
Area of use Identification Small 
Application 
Devices 
Internet Sensor 
Networks 
Cost*** 0.50-100$ ~5$ ~100$ ~2$ 
Table 5-6: Technology Comparison 
 
* Since W-LAN is typically used as network technology for computers it consumes so much 
energy that it is not useable on normal batteries. 
** Information regarding RFID is pretty much impossible to determine as there is a vast 
number of different standards which all will have different specs. A passive RFID chip will in 
effect have an infinite lifetime as it posses no power source at all.  
*** Cost is a price based on market prices found on the internet and is a price per chip. 
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6 Secure Routing 
In this chapter we will take a look at different routing solutions proposed for wireless ad-hoc 
networks. Seeing that there hasn’t been too much focus on security around the standard 
protocols used for routing so far, we will not take a look at those. Considering our case, only 
secure protocols do interest us and thus we will try to determine which of the available 
routing protocols will fit our needs and eventually decide to implement it into our final 
solution.  
6.1 Routing 
Data packets can be transmitted directly between to nodes if they are within wireless 
transmission range, no routing is required then (see Figure 6.1, on the left). But in the real ad-
hoc environments, where most cases these two nodes are not within the wireless transmission 
range and data packets need to route through one or several intermediate nodes before they 
reach the destination (see Figure 6.1, on the right). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Data transmitted directly and through an intermediate node  
6.2 Table Driven and On-Demand protocols 
When node A attempts to communicate with node B, and find out that node B is not within its 
wireless transmission range and a direct communication is not possible. To route the data 
packets to the destination node, node A need to route the data packets through one or several 
intermediate node, which is within the range of both node A and node B. When the data 
packets arrives an intermediate node, the intermediate node determine whether or not it is the 
destination node. If not, it forwards these packets to its neighbor node or the destination node 
(the case where neighbor node is destination node). 
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Ad hoc wireless routing protocols can be divided into two categories, table driven (proactive) 
routing protocol and on-demand (reactive) routing protocol [9]. In proactive routing protocol, 
the nodes store routing information to all the nodes in the entire network in a routing table. 
These routing tables are updating as the network topology changes. While reactive routing 
protocols, the up-to-date route tables are not maintained. When a source attempts to send data 
packets to a destination node, it invokes a route discovery procedure (see subsection 6.3.1) to 
find a path to the destination. In the following subsections we outline the two most relevant 
protocols, AODV-Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (On-Demand) and SDR-Dynamic 
Source Routing Protocol (table-driven). 
6.3 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
The Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [9] is a routing protocol designed for use 
in wireless ad hoc mobile networks. In AODV the network is completely self-organizing and 
self-configuring and without the need of any network infrastructure or administration. AODV 
are characterized as On-demand protocol. When the need arise the AODV protocols invokes a 
route discovery procedure to find the path to destination. The found paths are maintains as 
long as they are needed by the sources. AODV is capable of both unicast and multicast 
routing. AODV uses sequence numbers to ensure the freshness of routes. It is loop-free, self-
starting, and scales to large numbers of mobile nodes. 
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6.3.1 Broadcast RREQ 
When a source node does not have a route for a required destination, AODV invokes a route 
discovery by broadcasting a route request (RREQ) packet to every node within its wireless 
transmission range (see Figure 6.2).  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Source Node sends RREQ (source: [9]) 
 
The RREQ contains the source node's IP address, current sequence number, and broadcast ID; 
the RREQ also contains the most recent sequence number for the destination. 
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6.3.2 Intermediate Node Rebroadcasts RREQ 
When receiving the RREQ packet, every node forward the RREQ packet to its neighbors if it 
self is not the destination. When forwarding the RREQ packet, the node has to update its route 
table to include a reverse point in the reverse path to the source (see Figure 6.3). This process 
will continue until a route to the destination node is found, or the route request process times 
out. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Intermediate Node 1 rebroadcasts RREQ (source: [9]) 
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6.3.3 Intermediate Node Sends RREP 
When a node is the destination node, or has a route to the destination node, it will respond by 
sending a route reply (RREP) to the source node (see Figure 6.4). Intermediate nodes update 
their route information about the source and destination nodes.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Intermediate Node 2 sends RREP (source: [9]) 
 
 
Upon receiving the RREP, the source node creates a new route and the source node can 
forward data to the destination node using this newly created route. If the RREP is not 
received within a certain time frame, the source node will retry the RREQ.  
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6.3.4 Broken Communication 
A route will remain active as long as data continues to travel across the route. If a route 
becomes inactive for a defined period of time, the route will be deleted. Each time a packet is 
sent across a route, the timer is reset. When a communication is broken, a route error (RERR) 
will be send to any neighbors that had been using the node as the next hop (see Figure 6.5). 
Each node deletes the invalid route from its route table after receiving the RERR. If a route to 
the destination is still required, the source node will re-invoke the route discovery process.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Destination Node has been separated from the network (source: [9]) 
 
To avoid the route loops and to guarantee the freshness of route information, AODV uses the 
sequence numbers. Each route maintains a sequence number, with higher sequence numbers 
indicating “fresher” routes. The sequence numbers are incremented when the RREQ, RREP 
and RERR are broadcasted. When multiple routes are available to a destination node, the 
route with the greatest sequence number is used. Packets with lower sequence numbers are 
ignored and dropped. 
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6.4 Dynamic Source Routing Protocol 
Similar to AODV [9] the Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) [10] is also a routing 
protocol designed for use in wireless ad hoc mobile networks. DSR is composed by two 
mechanisms, Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. The purposes of these mechanisms 
are to allow nodes to discover and maintain the source route to destination in the ad hoc 
network. DSR does not use periodic routing advertisement, link status sensing or neighbor 
detection packets. As the nodes move and the communication pattern change, DSR packet 
overhead automatically (on-demand) scales to only that needed to track the routes currently in 
use. The nodes learn and cache multiple routes to any destination for future use. If a route 
fails to destination, a node may try another route in the cache. This reduces the need to 
perform a new Route Discovery each time a route in use breaks. 
6.4.1 Route Discovery 
When a source node S attempts to send a packet to destination node D it search for the 
suitable route in the cache. If the suitable route is found, it places the source route and 
sequence of hop in the header of the packet and the packet should follow this route all the way 
to destination. When a source node S attempts to send a packet to destination node D and does 
not have a route for the required destination, it performs a Route Discovery. Similar to 
AODV, the source node S broadcast (local) RREQ-packet to all the nodes within the wireless 
transmission range (see Figure 6.2). Upon receiving the RREQ-packet and if the node is the 
target, it sends RREP-packet back to the initiator of the Route Discovery (similar to AODV, 
see Figure 6.4). The initiator then caches the route which is used to send data-packets to the 
destination. The node saves the original data-packets in a Send Buffer while the node 
initiating a Route Discovery. The node sends the data-packets when a route is available. To 
prevent the RREQ-packet loops in a circle, the node drop the RREQ-packet if it has recently 
received the same RREQ-packet with the same request id and it finds it self in the route-list. 
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6.4.2 Route Maintenance 
When the packet follow the source route to the destination, the packet is responsible for 
confirming that the packet is received by the next hop along the route to destination. For 
example source node S is responsible for receipt of the packet at INT_1, node INT_1 is 
responsible for receipt of the packet at INT_2, node INT_2 is responsible for receipt of the 
packet at INT_3, and so forth along the route to the destination (see Figure 6.6). If the packet 
is retransmitted by Max_Hop (maximum hop count) and no receipt is received, the node 
returns RERR (Route Error) to the source node S (original sender of the packet). The source 
node S then removes this broken route from its route cache and S try to send the packet 
through another route from its route cache. If no other route are available the source node S 
need to initiate a new Route Discovery.   
 
 
Figure 6.6: Nodes responsible for receipt at the next hop (source: [10]) 
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6.4.3 DSR vs. AODV 
The following table compares the two routing protocols SDR and AODV: 
 
DSR vs. AODV 
Properties                                                              DSR AODV 
Loop Free, Distributed, Reactive Yes Yes 
Multicast capability No Yes 
Multiple route Yes No 
Routes maintained in Route cache Route table 
Routing table format Full path Next hop 
Routing metric Shortest paths Freshest & Shortest 
Route checking Passive ACKs ‘Hello’ messages 
Utilizes route cache/table expiration timers No Yes 
Unidirectional link support Yes No 
Periodic broadcasts No Yes 
CPU/Memory usage High Low 
Scalability Poor Excellent 
Rate of propagation Fast Slower 
Ability to handle frequent topology change Good Fair 
Table 6-1: DSR vs. AODV 
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6.5 Trust Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
Trusted AODV (TAODV) reuses AODV [9] (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector) and 
employs trust functionalities to protect routing information (see Figure 6.7) [11]. 
6.5.1 TAODV Framework 
 
Figure 6.7: Framework of the Trusted AODV (TAODV) (source: [11]) 
 
The TAODV protocol employs trust functionalities to protect routing information by using an 
opinion metric [x, y, z]. The metric [x, y, z] represents Belief, Disbelief and Uncertain 
respectively. Initially each node’s opinion metric is [0, 0, 1], which mean that the nodes do 
not trust or distrust. The uncertainty among them are high (Uncertain=1), but after a period of 
time the components in the opinion metric will change according to successful or failed 
communications. This means that after a successful communication the first component 
(correspond to Belief) in the opinion metric will increase, otherwise a failed communication 
will cause the second component (correspond to Disbelief) to rise and the third components 
will then decrease correspond to sum of these three components must be 1(see Figure 6.8 and 
6.9). Opinion in TAODV is 3-dimentional metric and is defined as follow: 
Definition (opinion): Let ( )A A A Ab d u
B B B B
ω = + + denote any node A’s opinion about any 
node B’s trustworthiness in a network, where the first, second and third component 
correspond to belief, disbelief and uncertainty, respectively and these components satisfy: 
               1A A Ab d u
B B B
+ + =  
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Suppose node A invokes a route discovery to find a route to B. But in the first place A is not 
sure whether it should believe or disbelieve any other nodes. A will then use a secure scheme 
to perform the route discovery. 
  
 
Figure 6.8: Initialization for TOADV (source: [11]) 
  
Initially A is not sure whether it should believe or disbelieve any other nodes. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: TAODV after a period of time (source: [11]) 
 
A will update its opinions toward the other nodes after some successful or failed 
communications. 
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6.5.2 Trust Model 
Trust model is composed by Trust Recommendation, Trust Combination, Trust Judging and 
Trust Updating and their task as follow: 
 
• Trust Recommendation – The Trust Recommendation protocol is used when a node 
want to know trustworthiness toward another nodes. 
• Trust Combination – Several nodes operate with different trustworthiness about 
other nodes. To get a relative trustworthiness about a node, TAODV uses the Trust 
Combination operation to combine different opinions to get relative one. 
• Trust Judging - The Trust Judging contains rules what the node should do according 
to opinion. The rules as follow: 
 
1. If A’s opinion toward a node B with the Belief-component of opinion is 
larger than 0.5, A will trust B and continue to perform routing related to B. 
2. If A’s opinion toward a node B with the Disbelief-component of opinion is 
larger than 0.5, A will not trust B and will refuse to perform routing related to 
B. 
3. If A’s opinion toward a node B with the Uncertain-component of opinion is 
larger than 0.5, A will request B’s digital signature whenever A has 
interaction with B. 
4. If A’s opinion toward a node B with all the components (Belief, Disbelief, 
Uncertain) of opinion are smaller than or equal 0.5, A will trust B and 
continue to perform routing related to B. 
5. If node B has no route entry in node A’s routing table, A’s opinion about B is 
initialized as [0, 0, 1]. 
 
• Trust Updating – The Trust Updating contains several policies, which describe how 
and when a node needs to update the trust opinion. The policies as follow: 
 
1. Each time a node A has performed a successful communication with another 
node B, B’s successful events in A’s routing table will be increase by 1. 
2. Each time a node A has performed a failed communication with another node 
B, B’s failed events in A’s routing table will be increase by 1. 
3. Each time when the field of the successful or failed events changes, the 
corresponding values of opinion will be recalculated. 
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4. If node B’s route entry has been deleted from node A’s route table because of 
expiry, or there is no B’s route entry from the beginning, the A’s opinion to B 
will be set to [0, 0, 1]. 
_ _ 
6.5.3 Modified Routing Table with Trust Information 
TAODV add three new fields into each node’s original routing table: positive events, negative 
events and opinion (see Figure 6.10).  
 
 
Figure 6.10: Modified Routing Table 
 
The new fields, positive/negative events correspond to successful/failed communication times 
between two nodes. Opinion means this node’s belief towards another node’s trustworthiness.  
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6.6 Secure Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) 
SAODV [12] also uses AODV and add additional functionalities to secure the AODV 
messages. Hence no security are implemented in AODV, malicious nodes can perform 
different attacks against AODV. SAODV has implemented to mechanisms to secure the 
AODV messages, hash chains [15] and digital signatures [14]. Digital signatures are used to 
authenticate the non-mutable fields of the messages, and hash chains are used to secure the 
hop count information (see Figure 6.11 and 6.12). 
 
 
Figure 6.11: RREQ and RREP Message Format  
 
 
Figure 6.12: RREQ and RREP Signature Extension Format (source: [12]) 
 
Every time a node broadcast a RREQ or RREP, first it generates a seed (a random number) 
and applies a one way hashing to this seed with Max_Hop_Count times, where the 
Max_Hop_Count equal the TimeToLive from IP-header. This is done to ensure that the 
Hop_Count has not been modified by an attacker. To protect the integrity of the non-mutable 
fields in RREQ and RREP, SAODV uses Digital Signatures to sign all the non-mutable fields 
and the seed using security system like IPsec. 
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6.7 Security - Aware Ad-Hoc Routing for Wireless Networks 
Similar to TAODV [11], Security – Aware ad-hoc routing (SAR) [13] uses AODV [9] and 
employs additional functionalities to ensure that data is routed through a secure route and 
secure the information in the routing protocol messages. Messages route through nodes are 
based on quality of security. This means that messages routes only through secure nodes and 
not through insecure nodes even if the path is shorter (see Figure 6.13). If one or more routes 
that satisfy the required security, SAR will find the shortest route. And if several nodes with 
the same length and satisfies security requirements, SAR will find routes that are optimal. On 
the other hand if the ad-hoc network does not have a path with nodes that satisfy security 
requirements, SAR may fail to find a route even if the network is connected. 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Secure Route and Shortest Route (source: [13]) 
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6.7.1 Trust Hierarchy 
Nodes are organized like tree hierarchy and associated a number with each privilege level. 
These numbers represent the trust level (security, importance and capability) of the mobile 
nodes and their paths (see Figure 6.14).  
 
Figure 6.14: Trust Hierarchy (source: [13]) 
 
These trust level should be immutable. A node with a lower trust level should not be able to 
change its trust level, or change the trust level of the other RREQ request it forwards. To 
provide this guarantee, many techniques can be employed. 
6.7.2 Route Discovery and Changes to RREQ and RREP 
In Security-aware AODV, the RREQ have two additional fields. The first is 
RQ_SEC_REQUIREMENT (see Figure 6.15) that indicates the required security level in the 
trust hierarchy for the route the sender wishes to discover. This field is fixed and is only set 
once by the sender. When the RREQ message arrive a node, the protocol uses this field to 
check if the node satisfies the security requirement or not. If the node satisfies the security 
requirement, then protocol forward the RREQ packet to it neighbors. Otherwise, if the 
security requirement is not satisfied the packet is dropped even if the network is connected. 
The second additional field is RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE. This field indicates the maximum 
level of security afforded by the paths discovered. This field is useful in the case where route 
discovery discovers a route that is more secure than the sender asked for. It is also useful for 
the security aware applications to get more detailed information about the quality of security 
for the paths discovered. 
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Figure 6.15: Changes to RREQ and RREP (source: [13]) 
 
The arrival of a RREQ packet at the destination indicates the presence of a path from the 
sender to the receiver that satisfies the security requirement specified by the sender. The 
destination node sends the RREP packet as in AODV, but with additional information 
indicating the maximum security available over the path. This information is suitably 
protected so that only nodes that belong to a particular trust level can process these packets. 
The value of the RQ SEC GUARANTEE field in the RREQ packet is copied to RP SEC 
GUARANTEE field in the RREP packet. When the RREP packets arrives at an intermediate 
node in the reverse path, intermediate nodes that are allowed to participate, update their 
routing tables as in AODV and also record the new RP SEC GUARANTEE value. This value 
indicates the maximum security available on the cached forward path. When a trusted 
intermediate node answers a RREQ query using cached information, this value is compared to 
the security requirement in the RREQ packet and only when the forward path can guarantee 
enough security is the cached path information sent back in the RREP. 
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6.8 Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) 
The main goal of the Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) is to secure the peer-to-
peer wireless connection. SNEP provides confidentiality, data integrity and data freshness. 
Facts: 
• 8 Byte Overhead per message 
• Keeps state at each end points, which makes it unnecessary to transmit the counter 
• Semantic Security (randomization)   
Properties: 
• Semantic Security: Counter value is incremented each time a message is sent. This 
means that each message is encrypted differently. Before each message a random bit 
string will be sent to make it impossible to guess if a bit is 1 or 0.  
• Communicating parties share a counter, which is used as an Initialization Vector (IV) 
• Counter is not sent with the message 
• Counter value is never repeated 
• Counter value in MAC prevents replay attacks 
• Data authentication: Uses a MAC (Message Authentication Code) to verify origination 
of the message. 
• Replay Protection: Counter value included in the MAC prevents this. 
• Weak freshness: The receiver will know that a message has been sent after the previous 
message has been received correctly if it verifies correctly. 
• Low communication overhead: Since the counter state is kept on each end point it 
doesn't need to be send hence reducing overhead. 
 
The base station shares a master key with all nodes. Nodes-to-nodes keys can be negotiated 
with help of the base station. Initially two devices A and B will share a master key KA,B, 
which is used as input into the RC5 function [33] to generate the encryption key (Kencryption), 
the MAC key (KMAC) and the random number generator key (KRAND). The key scheduling 
process is depicted in the figure below. Later, these keys will be use in the encryption process, 
the authentication process and to generate the MAC. 
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Figure 6.16: SNEP Key scheduling 
 
 
Notations: 
Encrypted data: E = {D} (Kencryption,C) 
MAC: M = MAC (KMAC,C|E) 
 
SNEP provides two types of messages from A to B: 
With encryption: 
{Msg}<Key_encrytion, Counter>, MAC(KMAC, Counter | {Msg}<Key_encrytion, Counter>)   
 
Without encryption:   
Msg, MAC(KMAC, Msg)  
 
Where ‘D’ is the data, ‘C’ is the Counter (Initialization Vector), ‘Kencryption’ is the encryption 
key and ‘KMAC’ is the MAC key. 
6.8.1 SNEP Encryption 
SNEP encrypts the messages using the Keyencryption and a Counter. The Counter value is 
incremented each time a message is sent. This means that each message is encrypted 
differently. Before each message a random bit string will be sent to make it impossible to 
guess if a bit is 1 or 0. The RC5 function takes Counter and Keyencryption as inputs. The outputs 
are then XOR with the plain text to get cipher text. The processes are depicted in the figure 
below. 
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Figure 6.17: SNEP Encryption 
6.8.2 SNEP MAC 
Data authentication uses a MAC (Message Authentication Code) to verify origination of the 
message. SNEP MAC uses Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) where every block of inputs are 
affects the outputs. The processes are depicted in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 6.18: SNEP MAC generation 
6.8.3 SNEP Authentication  
SNEP provides Authentication either with or without encryption. For the Authentication with 
encryption, the messages are encrypted and the Counter is included in the MAC. The Base 
stations will keep the current Counter for every node.  
The processes are depicted in the figure below. 
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Figure 6.19: SNEP Authentication 
 
For more detailed information and reference see [16]. 
 
6.9 µTESLA 
µTESLA is a lightweight implementation of the TESLA protocol. The original protocol has a 
packet overhead of 24 bytes. A standard size message in a sensor network is about 30 byte. 
Furthermore the key chain will not fit into the memory of a node. µTESLA implements 
asymmetric authentication through a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys. This is done to 
reduce the computational demands of asymmetric keys. To do this it requires the nodes to be 
loosely time synchronized, a maximum synchronization error and a time schedule for 
disclosure of the keys. The base station will first compute a MAC on the packet it wants to 
send to a node. The node on its side will receive the message and verify that the 
corresponding MAC key hasn’t been disclosed yet by using the clock and maximum 
synchronization error. The base station will distribute the verification key to a given time. 
Now the node will use the verification key to verify the correctness of the stored packet. 
6.9.1 Sender Setup 
The first thing a sender does is to generate a sequence of secret keys. Those one way key-
chains of length n are generated by randomly choosing  as the last key. The remaining 
values are calculated using a one way function F (e.g. MD5 [29]). 
nK
jK  = 1( jF K + ). Since a 
one way function is used one can only compute forward, which means you can compute K0 if 
you have 1jK +  given. This renders one however unable to compute 1jK +  if you have . 0K
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6.9.2 Broadcasting 
Each key of the one-way key chain is assigned to a uniform divided time interval. This means 
in time interval i, is being used to compute the message authentication code (MAC). Key 
disclosure is delayed a few time intervals. This amount of time is mostly chosen to be greater 
than a normal roundtrip time between the sender and its receivers.  
iK
6.9.3 Bootstrapping a new receiver 
Since we are using a one-way key chain all keys are self-authenticating. All we need to start 
with is one authenticated key ( ) and can thus verify a new key ( ) with using  
= ). The requirements to bootstrap µTESLA are one authenticated key, the nodes need 
to be loosely time synchronized and the receiver has to have knowledge about the key 
disclosure time. To resolve the last two problems a mechanism that offers strong freshness 
and point-to-point authentication can be used. The mechanism works as follows that the 
receiver R sends a nonce  in a request message to sender S. S then returns its current time 
 a key  which was used in the past interval I, the starting time of that interval , the 
duration  and the disclosure delay
iK 1iK + iK
1( iF K +
RN
ST iK iT
intT δ . 
: MM S N→  
int int
: | | | | | ( | | | | | | )S i i MS M S i iS M T K T T MAC K N T K T Tδ δ→  
6.10  ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks) 
According to [17] ARAN is a fairly simple routing protocol. It consists of a preliminary 
certification and a route instantiation process. To discover routing paths is achieved by 
broadcasting a route discovery message from a source node which is replied to unicast by the 
destination node. 
To achieve certification the protocol requires a trusted certificate server. All nodes have to 
know its public key. The way this key is distributed is not specified by the protocol and will 
require and individual solution. After certification is with a certificate server is completed a 
node A with receive a certificate message from the server which includes the IP address of A, 
the public key of A, a timestamp of when the certificate was created and a time when the 
certificate expires. Nodes now will use those certificates to authenticate themselves to other 
nodes during message exchanges.  
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6.11  Summary 
In chapter 5.5 we concluded that ZigBee is the most promising solution. However the 
intention was to look at other secure routing protocols independent of technology choice. As 
there might be routing protocols better suited for our case than those deployed with standard 
packages. 
As outlined in the subsections above, the most of the secure protocols are based on AODV or 
DSR. AODV, however, doesn’t provide any security at all. To secure the packets under 
transit, TAODV, SAODV and SAR employ security functionalities upon AODV. These 
security functionalities again are based on one of the cryptographic schemes. Since ZigBee 
uses AODV and AES. AES takes use of Rinjdael algorithm which is known to be the most 
secure algorithm today. At this point we do not see the intention to take other considerations 
than the use of AODV and AES as it is implemented in ZigBee/802.15.4. 
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7 Proposed Solution 
In this chapter we will outline our proposed solution to the case scenario. After choosing 
technology and routing protocol in the previous to chapters, we will now outline a solution for 
the application part of the case. This chapter will build the foundation for the following 
chapter where we will attempt to design a working model and eventually if there is time 
create a test model and prototype. Our model will contain sufficient information to build a 
framework for a prototype.  
7.1 Wireless Ad-hoc network technology 
As lined out in chapter 5 we will use ZigBee for the implementation of our solution to the 
case scenario.  
7.2 Routing Protocol 
As we choose 802.15.4 as our wireless Ad-hoc network technology, it seems to us to be a 
logical step to choose ZigBee which is build upon 802.15.4 with the purpose of delivering an 
ad-hoc wireless sensor network technology. We are going to describe the solution around 
ZigBee and use different solutions as far as possible if we feel ZigBee will not be able to cope 
with a setting on its own. Our solution presented in this chapter describes the application level 
of it.  Reliable transmission and transmission security is handled by ZigBee. We do however 
implement an extra layer of security using encryption where we handle sensitive information. 
ZigBee will also take care of route discovery and synchronization of timestamps.  
7.3 Nodes 
In our solution we will have two different types of nodes. The first type is the car node (CN) 
which is the ad-hoc part of the wireless network. The second types are the so called controller 
nodes performing operational and routing tasks. Those will be static implementations and are 
the trusted part of the network (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1: Nodes 
7.3.1 Car Node 
The chip installed in the car will be the initiator of any communication with the system. Its 
first action will be to authenticate with the closest Group Controller. Since we will apply end-
to-end authentication the CN will not communicate with the GC except for polling responses 
and use it as a means of getting the information to its proper destination. The CN will contain 
following fields needed for authentication with the system. 
 
Name Description 
UID Unique Identifier 
SSKK  Shared Secret Key 
LNR License Number 
TS Timestamp 
Table 7-1 Car Node Data Fields 
 
Given this table we get the following formula for the first message to be sent by the CN to the 
SC/Database. Note that this message is not sent directly, but going via Row and Group 
Controllers before it reaches the Super Controller (See Figure 7.1). 
 
( )CN SC SSKMSG K UID TS LNR→ = + +  
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UID and TS will be encrypted by the CN’s secret key ( ). This is done to ensure that UID 
cannot be read by intruders and TS is added to ensure freshness of the data to prevent replay 
attacks. 
SSKK
7.3.2 Controller Nodes 
The tasks of the Controller Nodes are to perform routing operations and ensure reliable data 
transfer from the CNs towards the Super Controller (SC). They will authenticate themselves 
using a secret key encryption method. They will inherit a key which is also known to the SC 
and will use this to authenticate each other.  
Each node will store some basic routing information of which other nodes it is connected to. 
  
Name Description 
GCID Group Controller Identifier 
SSKGCK  Shared Secret Key (Group Controller) 
GCTempID  Temporary ID assigned by SC 
RCList[] List of all RCs connected to the GC 
GCList[] List of all GCs connected to the GC 
CarList[] List of all cars connected to the GC 
SCPointer Routing information to reach the SC 
TS Timestamp 
Table 7-2 Group Controller Data Fields 
 
Name Description 
RCID Row Controller Identifier 
SSKRCK  Shared Secret Key (Row Controller) 
RCTempID  Temporary ID assigned by SC 
RCList[] List of all RCs connected to the RC 
GCList[] List of all GCs connected to the RC 
SCPointer Routing information to reach the SC 
TS Timestamp 
Table 7-3 Row Controller Data Fields 
 
Note there is no direct link to the SC from a GC node as we want them to go through the 
nearest RC. Only if the RCList and GCList are empty a GC node will attempt to communicate 
directly with the SC if it detects in range. 
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A RC will have to keep track of other RCs it is connected to and other GCs it is supervising. 
It will store a shortest path (through other RCs) to the SC to reduce dataflow over the net to 
increase battery lifetime.  
 
Name Description 
SCID Supper Controller ID 
KeyList[] (database mode only) List over all Shared Secret Key for cars it has 
stored 
RCList[] List over all attached RC’s 
GCList[] List over all attached GC’s 
CarList[] List over all cars attached to the system 
Timestamp Timestamp for synchronization purposes 
Table 7-4 Super Controller Data Fields 
 
Taking a closer look at the tables stored on the SC we will see that KList [] is in fact the table 
which can be implemented in an external database if desired. If the system is to be 
implemented on a single parking lot it will be of no use to create an external database server 
to store car information. However if the system is to be implemented on several different 
parking lots with a common customer base it will be more efficient to use a common database 
server to check and store parking info. This will leave us with less computational power 
needed at the SCs, which in its turn will let us install smaller nodes which cost less. We will 
also get an increased term of security as an external database server can be put in a physically 
better protected place than what may be possible at parking lots. This has one weakness 
though as if the server gets compromised or “hacked” an attacker will gain access to 
information enough to bring down the entire system. In the scenario where all information is 
stored on SCs we will still have this problem however as we need to secure each node as good 
as possible to maintain a feasible security.  
After reading chapter 7 so far a natural question emerges that it might be better to combine 
GC and RC to one type of node as their area of use overlaps very much. Yes in the first place 
it may seem so. However, we give RCs a stronger transmitter so that they can send up to 100 
meters. A GC will only have a transmitting range of about 10 – 15 meter. Since the GC is 
doing the most of data transmitting it will also have the highest power consumption. Hence to 
increase the lifetime of our nodes it will use less power to transmit over short range, so we lay 
the task of sending for long range to the RCs. 
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7.3.3 External Database 
We envision using an external database connected to the SC via Internet to identify a car. The 
database will contain the secret key which is programmed into the CN. The key is used to 
establish secure end-to-end communication. It will receive the initial message from the CN, 
which contains License Number and the Unique ID. Using the License Number it will 
determine which secret key to use for decryption. If the decryption is successful the database 
will know that the CN is authentic. It will now return a message to the CN encrypted with the 
shared secret key. 
 
Re Re (" " )SSKg sp K OK LicenseNr TimeStamp= + +  
 
7.3.4 Data fields 
Down below is a presentation of the lists presented in the last sub chapters. 
The KeyList contains a reference from the LNr of each registered user to its UID and Shared 
Secret Key. This table is used for looking up the Secret Key and verifying the authenticity of 
a registering car. 
KeyList Data fields 
 LNR UID SSKK  Location 
Table 7-5 KeyList 
 
The CarList contains a list of all cars registered at a parking lot and when they are last polled 
or if a poll has failed. The SC will include a path to where to reach the car. 
 
CarList Data fields 
 LNR Path(SC only) Last_Poll Failed_Poll 
Table 7-6: CarList 
 
The RC/GCLists contain an overview of which nodes a Controller is in range too. It will also 
contain information about if it managed to authenticate them with the SC. 
 
RC/GCList Data fields 
 TempID Auth Last_Auth 
Table 7-7: RC/GCList 
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The SCPointer will contain information about which nodes to contact to reach the SC. We 
envision a pointer in the form:  GCNode(a)  GCNode(b)  RCNode(c)  SC → → →
7.4 Message Information 
7.4.1 CN Registration 
When a car is getting parked near to a GC it will first attach itself towards the network using 
standard ZigBee protocols and authentication methods. After this it will start its work to 
authenticate with the database. This may be the SC or an external server connected to via 
internet.  
 
After authentication with the corresponding GC a CN sends its Register Request (RegReq) to 
the network and awaits reply from the SC or Database server (see Figure 7.2). 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Message CN to GC 
 
 
The GC will do nothing to the package except to add its own ID and store the LNR to its car 
list. This will subsequently be done by each GC or RC which is contact with the package 
before getting to the SC (see Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.3: Message GC to SC via RC 
 
SC will now store GCID and RCID with the LNR to its car list to get the link where to reach 
the CN. GCID and RCID are removed before sending the message either to a database server 
or checking the authenticity of the CN. LNR will be used to look up the proper decryption 
Key. The key will now be used to decrypt the message and the received UID will be checked 
with the database. If the UID matches the stored ID the server will respond with a Register 
Respond message: 
    
Re Re (" " )SSKg sp K OK LicenseNr TimeStamp= + +  
If the check fails this will be sent: 
Re Re (" " )SSKg sp K Failed LicenseNr TimeStamp= + +  
 
If the registration process fails another time we envision a solution where the database sends a 
message to the car user and informs him/her that the car is not secured.  
7.4.2 CN Polling 
Once a node is registered we need to make sure that a car stays on its place until it is properly 
signed off. This is achieved by simply polling the CN in a periodic interval. If no response is 
given a message will be sent to the SC/Database.  
 
( )SSKMSG GCK LNr PollFailed GNr= + +  
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7.4.3 CN Signoff 
When a car wants to leave the parking lot we should let it do so. If we for example couple the 
signoff to when a car is started with its proper key the CN will send a Signoff message. 
 
( )SSKMSG K UID Signoff LNr= + +  
 
After this message is received the Database will inform the SC that the car is leaving, if the 
decryption is successful. The SC will now send a message down the chain to each RC and GC 
which are listed in the routing table for the specific car and order them to remove the car from 
their CarList. If the decryption fails the car will get reported as stolen. 
7.4.4 GC/RC Registration 
When we add new GC/RCs to our system, we need them to register with the SC. This will 
happen in a similar way as with a CN. All GC/RCs will have a unique ID and a Shared Secret 
Key. It will encrypt its unique ID with the Shared Secret Key and send it to the SC. The SC 
on its part will decrypt the message and verify the ID. If it is successful a confirmation 
message will be sent back. If it fails one retry chance is given. If this fails too the SC will sent 
out an alert to the system administrator warning him that there might be a possible attack. 
7.4.5 GC/RC Authentication 
Since GCs and RCs can connect to several different nodes of each type we want to implement 
a solution for a node checking another’s legitimacy. This is achieved by requesting the 
TempID from the node in question. Then encrypting it with its own  and sending it on 
the already authenticated path. If we call the other node for B and the node requesting the 
authentication for A, we get the following formula: 
SSKK
 
( )SSK A B AAuth K TempID TempID−= +  
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7.5 Encryption 
Initial, when the car is within the wireless transmission range of the GC it will start 
authentication procedure to verify the identity of the CN and the GC. At this state the 
authentication messages are encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, see 
subsection 5.4.5), which is implemented in ZigBee.  
Base on our solution described above, the messages which are sent to the Super Controller 
(SC)/Database to verify the membership contains Unique Identifier (UID) and this UID must 
be kept secret. The CN contains also a Shared Secret Key ( ) which is known only by the 
car and the SC/Database. To enhance the security at the authentication state the cars will 
encrypt the messages using Self-synchronizing stream ciphers [18]. Stream ciphers are secret-
key cryptography where the same key is used to compute and verify the messages. In this case 
the messages are encrypted/decrypted using the UID and Self-synchronizing stream ciphers 
(see Figure 7.4 and 7.5). 
SSKK
 
Self- synchronizing stream ciphers generates a key stream as a function of the key (UID) and 
a fixed number of previous cipher text digits. The encryption processes are depicted as 
follow: 
 
Encryption: 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Stream Ciphers Encryption 
 
  k = key (UID) 
  g = pseudorandom number generator which generates the key stream 
  Zi = key stream 
  mi = plaintext 
  h = XOR- function which XOR the key stream Ci with plaintext mi 
  Ci = cipher text 
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The pseudorandom number generator g takes k (UID) and a fixed number of previous cipher 
text digits as inputs, and generates a key stream Zi as output. Next the function h combines 
(XOR) the key stream Zi with the plaintext mi to produce the cipher text Ci. 
Decryption: 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Stream Ciphers Decryption 
 
k = key (UID) 
  g = pseudorandom number generator which generates the key stream 
  Zi = key stream 
  mi = plaintext 
  Ci = cipher text 
h-1 = XOR- function which XOR the key stream Ci with plaintext mi, 
an inverse process to decrypt the cipher text Ci.
 
To decrypt the cipher text Ci, the XOR-process is applied to cipher text Ci and the key stream 
to get the plaintext. 
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8 Model Description 
In this chapter we will present a model of our proposed solution. As a modeling tool we 
choose to use SPIN [31]. We choose SPIN due to that we have worked with it earlier and it’s 
a well suited tool to simulate protocols and distributed systems with.  
We wish to test our proposed solution in this tool, to demonstrate its workability and stability. 
Spin is a tool used for formal verification of distributed software systems. It has three modes 
of operation. It uses PROMELA, a high level language used to describe system descriptions, 
as syntax language.  
8.1 Model 
First we will take a look at the states of our Car Node. After that we will take a look at states 
of the RC and GC. Their function is quite similar to each other so it will suffice using one 
state machine for both. At last we will take a look at the SC, which will hold the registration 
processes and store the travel path to the cars. Message sequence charts are presented in 
chapter 7 and do not need to be repeated here. 
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8.1.1 State machine for Car Node 
 
Figure 8.1: Car Node State machine 
 
When we take a look at the state machine of our Car Node (Figure 8.1), we will see that upon 
external interaction (e.g. car is turned off) the registration process will start. It will start with 
the CN sending its registration information out on the ether to the closest GC. Now it will 
await a response from the network. In the cases registration fails or a timeout occurs it will try 
to re-register. Since its quite essential that the car gets registered even on a bad connection we 
set the limit to five retries. If registration is successful the CN will enter a passive mode where 
it will await the polling messages from the network. From this state also the Signoff 
procedure will be initiated. When the car wants to leave the CN will send a Signoff message 
to the GC. Incase this should fail one retry will be given. This is done since there will be a 
limit as of how many retries can be done until the car leaves the transmission range to its GC. 
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8.1.2 State machine for Group/Car Controller  
 
Figure 8.2: Group/Car Controller State machine 
 
Moving on from the Car Node to the next link in the chain we get to the “work horses” of our 
application. The Row and Group Controllers will perform message relaying and the periodical 
polling. Looking at the state machine (Figure 8.2) we see that those nodes will be listening to 
incoming data traffic. There are three types of messages that they should be able to process. 
First there are the registration messages from the CN. Since the GC/RCs are not capable to 
decrypt those messages they do only add their GC/RC number to the end of the messages and 
send them further on to the next link in the chain towards the SC. When a registration is 
successful a GC will add the LNr to its poll list. This is about the only point where there is a 
slight difference between a GC and RC. The RC can in this case either store a GC and the 
License number (LNr) to which it has to relay packets to reach a specific car or it simply 
stores an LNr which is attached directly to it. The second type of incoming data is a Signoff 
messages from a CNs.  This message will simply be relayed to next node up the chain towards 
and nothing will be done with it. The GC/RC awaits a response from the SC in order to relay 
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this message to the CN. If the Signoff was successful the CNs LNr will be deleted from the 
poll list. If it failed however it will remain in poll list and should it move out of sending range 
to the GC/RC it will be marked as stolen. This is where the last function of the GC/RC comes 
in. They will periodically poll all CNs they have stored in their Poll List. If a response is sent 
no action will be taken. If a node does not respond, a second poll to that specific node will be 
sent, if that one remains unanswered a notify message will be sent to the SC and the car 
marked stolen.   
Each GC and RC will also have a registration process similar to the CN (Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3: GC/RC Registration/SignOff 
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8.1.3 State machine for Super Controller 
 
Figure 8.4: Super Controller State machine 
Same as the GC/RC nodes the SC will be waiting for incoming data from the network. We 
define it to handle three types of data. First, will be an incoming registration from a CN 
relayed by GCs and RCs. It will take the LNr which is sent in plaintext and look it up in its 
database over all registered users of the network. In case the message decodes successfully, it 
will send a encrypted message back to the CN. It will also instruct all controller nodes on the 
way down to the CN to add the car to their list. If the message has been corrupted or is simply 
a fake it will only send a failure message back and ask the node to retry the registration 
process. Second, a Signoff message will be processed in the same way as the registration 
message. It will decrypt and the appropriate message will be sent. The last state is a response 
to a poll failure event. If a CN does not respond, a poll failure message will be sent to the CS. 
It will store the time of the last successful poll and when the CN was missing for the first 
time. Optional a system could be implemented that a SMS or any other form for messaging 
system will contact the owner and inform her/him of the loss of its car. It can also be sent to a 
central authority. Figure 8.4 illustrates the state machine described. 
8.2 Message 
Message flows have been presented in Chapter 7 and will not be repeated here. 
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9 Discussion 
Since we have no prototype to test our proposed solution we can only discuss matters at hand 
based on theory and the model we developed.  
In our general case description we choose to implement the network overview in one central 
node. This has the benefit that overall computational power is concentrated in one node and 
hence reduces power consumption throughout the network. This node may also be centrally 
placed so that it can be connected to the public power grid and only uses a battery as backup. 
This has some weaknesses though. First if the master node is compromised the entire network 
can be brought down. Second if the master node fails the network will also go down.  
 
For the time being ZigBee looks like a good solution for wireless sensor networks, but there 
are other technologies which also can accomplish the same task, like Bluetooth. Those would 
however require more work as they are not designed to work as sensors. Since they are 
designed to fulfill different roles they have a set of different abilities. WLAN and Bluetooth 
have access to more bandwidth as they are designed to transmit more data than ZigBee. 
Bluetooth on its side again is designed to connect devices to each other such as Mobile 
Phones and PDAs. This again gives it less transmission range. WLAN on its side is designed 
to send great amount of data over fairly large distances. Since increased transmission range 
and bandwidth increases battery consumption, we can see pretty easily that Bluetooth and 
WLAN are bound to use more than a short-range and low bandwidth solution. This is why we 
also considered RFID as it may be an everlasting solution due to the nature of passive chips. It 
has short range and low bandwidth. However, as shown in chapter 5 the range proved to be 
too limited. To keep the number of nodes as low as possible, we needed a reasonable 
transmission range. RFID was inadequate in any way doing this. Bluetooth was scratching the 
lower edge of the limitations we set. It might have been possible to rewrite the protocol stack 
of Bluetooth and use stronger transceivers, which however only would lead to fairly increased 
power usage. WLAN’s range was more than sufficient; however we don’t need 11+ Mbps/s 
data rates for sending some sensor information. Taking into consideration that WLAN is not 
designed to be used on battery driven devices its power consumption is fairly much for our 
case. An implementation would bring physical difficulties as it would require power cords to 
each transceiver node placed on the parking lot. 
There are also some technologies not discussed in this thesis, which might work as a solution. 
Those technologies were not taken into consideration as they are on a research project basis 
(e.g. SmartDust). ZigBee is today’s only commercial solution designed for sensor networks. 
In the course of the study, we looked at several different routing protocols. However, we 
decided to use the routing protocol that follows ZigBee. This decision was made after 
Morten Pedersen and Than Kim Thong                                                                               78
Formation of Secure Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Networks 
considering the level of security we wanted. Since ZigBee is, as stated before, designed to 
operate in a semi ad-hoc scenario, it has a routing protocol designed for exactly doing this 
task for us. This will ease the work when creating a prototype as the entire protocol stack of 
ZigBee does support our application. Taking a brief look on Bluetooth, we came to the 
conclusion that the security in Bluetooth is considered fairly weak. Here we would have to 
rewrite the protocol stack to make it work in our scenario. With ZigBee we get a developer 
environment, which will let us build our solution directly upon the ZigBee protocol stack. It 
will take care of re-transmission and general transmission security.  
Based on the theoretical part we anticipate it to perform well in a real life scenario. However, 
since we don’t have a prototype, so we do not know how it performs in a life like scenario. 
We also have to add that it’s a fairly new technology and there may be weakness we are not 
aware of and that has not yet been discussed.  
As we try to achieve a secure system which will take care of the sensitive data sent over the 
network, we analyzed several different routing protocols. Among them we analyzed some 
protocols which don’t implement any security at all. They serve as a foundation for a couple 
secure protocols though. We found none of them to be a better choice than the routing 
protocol already implemented in ZigBee. The Rinjdael algorithm which AES uses is said to 
be one of the more secure cryptology methods in use today. And as ZigBee uses AES we 
conclude that there is, as far as we can see, no need to rework ZigBee’s security architecture, 
as the solutions are not likely to be any more secure. Regardless of this we do not know the 
real strength of the ZigBee security architecture, as it hasn’t been tested thoroughly. We 
didn’t find any information on analysis made in thought of breaching the security of ZigBee.  
Out of this reason we implemented a Shared Secret Key system to make the system more 
secure and since we needed a way to authenticate a car, independent of location and what 
technology used. The main purpose of this solution is to achieve authentication, as we need to 
know who is registering with us and that would require too much data capacity if the system 
is to be implemented at different locations. This however has the positive side effect that we 
get an addition layer of security.  
 
Bottom line is even if ZigBee should show to be insecure our system would only partially be 
compromised. We send some data plaintext but it is not key information which can bring the 
network down. Doing excessive research on the Internet we did find very little information 
about weaknesses of the encryption protocols used and we guess this has yet to come as it is a 
new technology and not quite widespread yet. When its popularity increases we will naturally 
also see an increase in attacks against such systems and with this learn in how far ZigBee is 
truly secure. 
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10 Future Work 
Since we didn’t get to create a prototype and to test our proposed solution more thoroughly 
there is more work to be done. The first instance would be to create the SPIN [31] model and 
test it on logical errors. After that, it would be natural to create a prototype of our solution 
before any eventual product can be sold. Furthermore since ZigBee is such a new technology 
a study regarding its transmission security should be conducted. 
 
11 Conclusion 
After studying several different technologies we got to the conclusion that there are many out 
there which can do the job, but require very much work to get it working. Also they will 
require a lot more maintenance due to shorter lifetime of the devices. ZigBee offers a 
complete package, which will give us what we need to create a product solution. As stated in 
chapter 6.11 we concluded that the security architecture implemented in ZigBee is secure 
enough. There are as noted in the discussion unknown factor which yet remain to be 
discovered. In that case the ZigBee protocol stack is very small and easy to get an overview 
over, so it can be modified to fix upcoming problems. Seeing the great number of members in 
the ZigBee alliance, it sure is a technology with future as so many companies decide to 
support it.  
Considering our solution in a market situation, would our solution have any chance of 
surviving? Our system would only be truly effective if your car would be secured at any 
location. This would imply that each parking lot in a country would have this system 
installed. Seeing there are many different operators in this market, this will be a task next to 
impossible.  
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